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Iran has increased the price of gasoline by
25 percent, from 30 cents to 38 cents per
gallon, and is attempting to reduce
subsidies, Fars News Agency reported on
Wednesday. The quasi-official Iranian media
organization quoted Interior Minister
Mostafa Pour-Mohammadi as saying the move is
in keeping with the new budget law. Pour-Mohammadi
added that fuel rationing will begin June 5.
The move came as a surprise, particularly
given that the government said May 20 it had
no immediate plans to increase fuel prices.
The price hike could stoke public ire, and
it runs counter to the agenda of President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, whose political future
depends on his image as a populist leader
championing the cause of the downtrodden.
One explanation for what appears a bizarre
government decision is that it is part of a
plan by the pragmatic conservatives to
discredit Ahmadinejad and weaken the
influence of his ultraconservative faction.
Some might dismiss this as a conspiracy
theory, but a number of other recent
developments force us to consider that
Ahmadinejad could be in serious political
trouble at home. In fact, reports have
circulated about major disagreements between
the president and other senior Iranian
officials, especially on foreign policy
matters.
Saudi-owned daily newspaper Al Hayat
reported May 21 that Iranian national
security chief Ali Larijani has tendered his
resignation on five separate occasions in
recent months due to frustration over what
he considers irresponsible statements and
actions by Ahmadinejad. The newspaper added
that the intervention of Supreme Leader
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has temporarily
defused the situation, but Larijani feels
the president is jeopardizing Iranian
interests. These disputes deal with how to
conduct U.S.-Iranian negotiations over Iraq,
which will move into the public arena May
28, and who should lead these talks for
Tehran.
Ahmadinejad faces significant opposition to
his foreign policy positions from across the
Iranian political system, including from
Khamenei; the Expediency Council led by the
regime's no. 2, Ali Akbar Hashemi
Rafsanjani; parliament; and even the
country's elite military unit, the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps.
Ahmadinejad wants to play a major role in
talks with the United States and steer them
in the direction preferred by his
ultraconservative faction, which includes
senior members of the Basij militia, the
Guardian Council and the Assembly of
Experts, such as Ayatollahs Ahmad Jannati,
Abolghassem Khazali and his spiritual
mentor, Mohammad Taghi Mesbah Yazdi. But the
bulk of the establishment does not trust
Ahmadinejad with foreign policy, and
especially not with dealing with United
States on Iraq.
Indeed, opposition to Ahmadinejad is so
strong that, if it received the green light
from Khamenei, parliament would waste little
time impeaching him. However, Khamenei is
not interested in inciting internal turmoil
as Iran moves to shore up its influence in
Iraq and engages in risky negotiations with
Washington. While getting rid of Ahmadinejad
might not be an option right now, the
Iranian establishment is working to box in
the maverick president.
The fuel price hike is not the only tool
being used to do this. On May 22, parliament
approved for the third time legislation that
would extend its term but reduce the tenure
of the president. The bill, which proposes
holding legislative and presidential
elections simultaneously, with the next
round in November 2008, was approved by a
222-120 vote, with seven deputies
abstaining. If passed, it would extend the
life of the current parliament by seven
months and reduce Ahmadinejad's term by four
months. Ahmadinejad's allies on the Guardian
Council, which has the power of
parliamentary oversight, have twice rejected
this legislation as unconstitutional. Now
that parliament has approved the law for a
third time, the bill will go to the
Rafsanjani-led Expediency Council, which
arbitrates disputes between the legislature
and the Guardian Council, for a final
ruling, which could give the pragmatic
conservatives another victory against their
ultraconservative rivals.
The Iranians are not attempting to hide
these moves against Ahmadinejad. In fact, by
leaking the details of efforts to undercut
Ahmadinejad to the press, the Iranian
establishment is sending a message to
Washington that it is serious about pursuing
a deal on Iraq and is cleaning house -- and
Tehran expects the Bush administration to do
the same. These efforts notwithstanding, a
lot can go wrong before May 28, the
beginning of formal U.S.-Iranian talks on
Iraq, and it will be some time before anyone
can claim progress has been made. The
Iranian regime might have Ahmadinejad and
his allies contained for now, but things
could change should Khamenei, who is
seriously ill, no longer be at the helm. |
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